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Since the very beginning of their saga,
when thousands of Salvadoreans fleeing the
brutal repression of the Salvadorean
military and paramilitary sought refuge in
Honduras, the key issue has been one of
protection. Both the religious and lay
people of the diocese of Santa Rosa were
quick to respond and the church played a
very important role in assisting and
protecting the refugees pouring into its
area. Many Honduran peasants living near
the border opened their hearts and their
homes, sharing the little they had with
their Salvadorean brothers and sisters. In
stark contrast to the impressive human
solidarity of many of the Honduran people,
the Honduran military entered into
complicity with the Salvadorean military.
In May 1980, the Salvadorean army, along
with members of the infamous paramilitary
group, ORDEN, carried out a vast operation
in Chalatenango, in one of the northem
provinces of El Salvador. On May 14,
nlore than 4,000 Salvadorean peasants
(mainly women, children and elderly
people) tried ta flee across the Sumpul
River inta Honduras. Met by the Honduran
army, they were forced ta retum to the
Salvadorean side of the river where they
were mercilessly hunted down by the
Salvadorean anny. In the ensuing
massacre, more than 600 Salvadoreans were
killed. (Only three days before, the heads
of the Salvadorean and Honduran armies had
met in El Poy, a tawn on the border of the
two countries.)
This joint operation with the Salvadorean
military was the first concrete
manifestation of the attitude of the
Ronduran authorities towards the refugees.
The authorities consider the refugees
subversive because they fled from
govemment and govemment-linked para-
military forces. (Given that these people
saw family members brutally assassinated,
and their homes, crops and personal
belongings destroyed by government
forces, it is not surprising that they have
little regard for the Salvadorean
govemment.) This overt hostility on the
part of the Ronduran authorities has led to
very serious security problems for the
refugees over the years.
Throughout 1980, Salvadoreans continued
ta pour into Honduras. At first, the
Honduran government refused to recognize
them as refugees, but as the flow continued,
the govemment created the National
Commission on Refugees (CONARE) in
arder to control the growing SaIvadorean
population. Had the Honduran authorities
been completely free ta do what they
wanted, very likely they would have forced
aIl the Salvadoreans back across the border.
But fortunately other factors had ta be
taken into consideration. Honduras, in the
process of retuming ta a civilian
govemment after years of military rule, was
very concemed about its international
image. Refoulement of thousands of
Salvadoreans would certainly de tract from
the new democratic image that Honduras
was seeking to create.
During this period, the UNHCR tried to
work out some kind of arrangement with
Honduras. This was complicated by the
fact that Honduras had not signed either the
1951 Convention on Refugees or the 1967
Protacol. Nevertheless, it agreed ta allow
the UNHCR to operate within the country.
In January 1981, the Honduran govemment
and the UNHCR came ta an agreement on
the following four basic principles:
1. That Honduras would accept refugees
seeking asylum;
2. That Honduras would respect the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement;
3. That Salvadorean refugees would stay in
zones designated ta them by the Honduran
authorities; and
4. That Salvadorean refugees would not be
allowed ta work.
Only two months after the agreement was
reachcd, the Honduran military violated the
first two points. In March 1981, when the
Salvadorean National Guard entered the
department of Cabanas, buming crops and
houses and killing everyone it encountered,
more than 7,000 peasants fled towards the
Lcmpa River, which, like the Sumpul,
forms the border bctween El Salvador and
Honduras. As they tried to cross the river,
they were shelled and shot at by both the
Salvadorean and the Honduran military.
Upon receiving word that a large number of
Salvadoreans were being driven towards the
Honduran border, humanitarian agency
personnel, both Honduran and in-
ternational, raced to the Lempa River.
Because they arrived before the Hon-
duran military had positioned itself along
the banks of the river, they were able to
help approximately 4,000 Salvadoreans
reach the Honduran village of Los
Hemândez. Some 60 refugees were killed
after their arrivaI in Honduras; the number
that died in Salvadorean territory while
trying ta flee is unknown. In response to
this situation, the UNHCR sent re-
presentatives to the border ta negotiate
minimum security conditions for the
refugees with the civilian and military
authorities. In early April, the UNHCR
supervised the relocation of 3,000 refugees
from Los Hernândez ta a camp situated
below the town of La Virtud, near the
Gualgüfs River.
In November 1981, after another
Salvadorean military operation in Cabanas,
Honduran troops again tried to close the
border to refugees. Nevertheless, many
refugees continued to arrive during
November and December, most of them
having spent 15-30 days hiding by day and
moving by night. During this period, the
pressure from the Honduran authorities to
move the refugees out of the border region
became very intense; both the Salvadorean
and the Honduran military harassed and
threatened the humanitarian agencies and
the local Hondurans who were helping the
refugees. In the period between Novembcr
1981 and April 1982, during the forced
relocation of the Salvadorean refugees from
the La Virtud/Guarita area to the camp of
Mesa Grande near the town of San Marcos,
34 refugees and four Hondurans working
with the refugees were killed, and a total of
45 Salvadoreans and Hondurans living in
the border area disappeared. Many
Honduran families were forced to flee to
other parts of Honduras after receiving
threats from Honduran soldiers for having
helped the refugees.
The security of the Salvadorean refugees in
Honduras has been of constant concem to
the international community since lhat
time. How can a refugee population be
providcd with protection when the most
constant and scrious threat to ilS security
cornes from the military of the host
country? 'fhis conccm bccamc very
concrete on August 29, 1985, when the
Honduran military entercd the
Colomoncagua refugce camp in the
province of Intibuca. This unprovoked
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military attack against a defenceless refugee
population left two dead, two women raped,
ten refugees captured and over thirty
refugees wounded. This and other attacks
on refugee camps are linked 10 the issue of
relocation.
Since 1982, threats of forced relocation and
rumours of forced repatriation have
provoked one crisis after another. Over the
last four years, four different plans to
relocate the refugees 10 different sites
within Honduras have been proposed
successively. One after another, these plans
have been abandoned in the face of strong
domestic and international pressure against
them. Within Honduras, some of the
pressure against relocation came from
sec10rs of Honduran society who supported
the position of the refugees that any move
would likely lead 10 deteriorated security,
while others, such as certain sectors of the
Honduran military, wanted to get rid of the
refugees and favoured forced repatriation
rather than relocation further into Honduran
terri1ory.
The most recent of the four relocation
plans proposed the relocation of the
refugees in Colomoncagua and San Antonio
(Intibuca) to Mesa Grande. This would
have concentrated over 20,000 refugees in
a camp originally intended for 2,000
people. Given that repatriation did not
seem to be realistic in the short term, this
plan appeared to be acceptable 10 the
Honduran military who felt that it could
better control the refugees if they were all
in one camp.l
The last several months have seen many
important changes in Honduras that will
likely influence the situation of the
Salvadorean refugees. Two of the Most
important were the Honduran elections and
the replacement of the Chief of Staff of the
Honduran Armed Forces. Although the
newly elected Liberal government has not
announced an official position on the
question of Salvadorean refugees, President
Azcona has given a mixed message. He has
stated that although his govemment will
Dot MOye the refugees against their will, he
is very worried that the Honduran
govemment has little control over the
camps. If these comments are indicative of
the current thinking within the· Honduran
Edi1or's Note: For a more detailed
criticism of the relocation plans, see
Martin Barber and Meyer Browns1one,
"Relocating Refugees in Honduras", Refuge,
3, No. 2 (December 1983), pp. 12-15.
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government, it is likely that the refugees
will be allowed 10 remain in their existing
camps, but that the govemment will
attempt to increase its involvement in the
actual ronning of the camps.
This reading of the situation is backed by
the fact that relocation, which was such a
hot issue in the Honduran press in the last
half of 1985, has not been mentioned at aIl
since the beginning of 1986. In February,
the UNHCR confirmed that the most recent
in a series of plans 10 relocate refugees
from the camps of Colomoncagua and San
Antonio had indeed been cancelled.
Although there no longer appears 10 be any
threat of relocation in the foreseeable
future, the battle is not over. There are
signs that the military presence around the
camps has been increased and that
administrative changes which would give
the Honduran govemment more control
over the programme are in the works.
Sources close to the situation feel that
cancellation of the plans 10 move the
refugees is directly related 10 recom-
mendations made by Robert Gersony of the
Refugee Bureau of the U .S. State Depart-
ment The U.S. Embassy in Honduras has
always had a keen interest in seeing the
refugee camps moved in order 10 clear the
border area for military operations. Until
recently, the Embassy has been the major
force in favour of relocation. Robert
Gersony visited Honduras in October and
November 1985 to study the situation of
the Salvadorean refugees and to make
recommendations 10 the State Department
with regard 10 its future handling of the
situation. Apparently Gersony concluded
that relocation of the camps at this time
would be too compli~ated.
The refugees have always been firm that
they would never MOye willingly, therefore
it was clear that any attempt 10 relocate the
camps would involve the use of violence
by the military. It is interesting to note
that the State Department re-evaluation of
the situation look place in the wake of
strong international outcry concerning the
August 29 military attack on the camp of
Colomoncagua and the ensuing criticism of
Honduras regarding this incident in the
Executive Committee meetings of the
UNHCR. ([he Honduran government was
surprised and dismayed by the international
reaction 10 this incident) Gersony's
principal concern was to determine what
measures could he taken to ensure that the
Honduran military would be satisfied that
there were no guerrillas in the camps.
Apparently he sees the solution in
increased military control of the camps, in .••~
combination with increased administration
of the refugee programme on the part of the
Honduran govemment.
The second major event in recent months,
the replacement of General Walter L6pez 1
~:;::nd:: ~en~~d H:fmb~::: :~:~:~~ '1
military, is interpreted by most analysts as -~o~~:;anto :u:::~. har~~netJ~si:::ly~rs~: ~
correct, it is likely 10 have serious
consequences for the security of the
refugees. In recent months, the trend has
been towards more military presence and
control of the camps. This is reflected in
the frequency with which the military
enters the camps and harasses the refugees.
In January and February 1986, there were
numerous incidents of this type.
Of particular concem is an incident which
took place on the aftemoon of February 16
when 20 soldiers entered Colomoncagua
and set up three small-ealiber machine guns
inside camp territory beside the UNHCR
house on the hilltop halfway between the
sub-camps of Copinol and Callejones. The
guns were set up only 30 meters above the
chapel where Mass was being held. Half an
hour later, the soldiers moved down to the
soccer field in the Las Vegas sub-camp
where they installed machine guns at the
four corners of the field and settled in for
the night. At 8:30 in the evening, they
sent up a "light rocket" which illuminated
the camps and then fell into the ravine
behind the health centre where it set the
hill on rrre. Such incidents, whereby the
military harasses and intimidates, are
terrifying for a refugee population which
has already suffered so much direct
repression at the hands of the Honduran
military. "Psychological warfare" of this
nature has substantially increased the
tension and fear in the camps.
As is frequently the case when the military
enters the camps, there was no UNHCR
protection offtcer presenl in either the
camp or the town of Colomoncagua at the
time of the February 16 incident The
refugees contend that the UNHCR
protection presence is not adequate. They
feel that the military deliberately chooses
times when there is no UNHCR presence in
order 10 enter the camps. For this reason,
it is important that there always be at least
one UNHCR protection officer present in
each camp. This analysis of security needs
is supported both by the agencies working
in the refugee programme and by many
international agencies and human rights
'. ations which have been monitoringorg~tuation over the last five years (see
the I~VA resolution on page 6).
the
agencies working in the refugee
The tJUIle under the co-ordination of the
Pro~R have recently been informed by the
1.Jf"lIleR that the Honduran govemment is
VN. interested in the "Mexican Model".
verY Mexico, the government is directly
(In nsib1e for the administration of the
resPoee programme through COMAR, the
refug~ment refugee commission.) Over the
goveJ.J.~
. year and a half, the Honduran
la5t rnment has frequently complained in
goveIlonduran press that it has no control
the r the camps. In November 1984, it
o~ccd the issue of a permanent Honduran
raiS erament presence in the camps. When
goVstiOned with regard to what type of
quepIe CONARE would place in the camps,
~~onel Turcios replied that they were
°nsidering using retired military
ca T d .rsonnel. 0 ate, no concrete actIon
~~ resul~d from this, but now th~t
relocation 1S no longer on the agenda, It
pears that the Honduran government's~terest in this proposal has been revived.
There are also other indications that the
Bonduran government is making a move to
sert control over the situation. Three of
aS "d" .the most recent ln lcations are:
1. In mid-February, two articles in the
Bonduran press announced that MSF
(Médecins Sans Frontières, the French
edical agency whose international
~lunteerS run the health programme in the
aI1lPs) would be asked to leave the
crogranune by May of this year and would
:e replaced by Honduran doctors. The
.ncident that provoked the story,
loncerning a Honduran doctor who blamed
~SF for losing his job, was blown out of
roportion by the Ministry of Health
~hich used the occasion to lobby against
the presence of MSF in the refugee
progralllll1e. Lengthy negotiations were
necessary to ensure the continued
participation of international medical
ersonnel in the programme. ([he
~resence of international agency personnel
.0 the camps has always been extremely
~portant in terms of the security of the
rcfugees.)
2. on February 19, the immigration
officiaIs in San Marcos, near the camp of
Mesa Grande, informed the UNHCR that no
neW male refugees between the ages of 18
and 50 wouId be aliowed to enter the
call1ps. Severa! men in this age bracket
had just arrived and Honduran immigration
officiaIs were threatening to deport them.
These new refugees were kept in the
UNHCR house in San Marcos until the
UNHCR was able to negotiate their
entrance into Mesa Grande. In the end the
UNHCR aise was able to have the new
restriction rescinded. The successful
resolution of this particular crisis through
the immediate intervention of the UNHCR
only serves to underline the importance of
its presence in the camps at aIl times.
3. It appears that aIl requests for
permission to enter the camps, bath for
visitors as weIl as for new staff persans,
must now be addressed directly to Colonel
Turcios. Previously, requests were made to
Colonel Turcios via the UNHCR.
Of primary concem in this increasingly
complex situation is how 10 guarantee
security when the very authorities that have
been responsible for threats to the security
of the refugees are beginning ta insist on
more control over the camps. Although
the Honduran government has a sovereign
right 10 determine what happens within its
territory, this does not relieve it of its
international Iegal obligations ta respect
the human rights of the refugees within its
borders. Since there are no international
mechanisms which guarantee that these
legal obligations are respected, the
international community has a moral
obligation to defend a refugee population
whose human rights are being threatcned.
Experience over the last few years has
shown that international pressure with
regard to this issue has been extremely
effective. Although it appears that aIl
plans 10 relocate Salvadorean refugees from
Colomoncagua and San Antonio have been
officially cancelled, the position of the
refuge~s continues to be extremely
precanous. In the context of escalating
intimidation and harassment of the refugees
by the Honduran military, the continued
role of the UNHCR in the co-ordination of
the programme, and the presence of
sufficient numbers of qualified UNHCR
protection officers and international agency
staff in the camps continue to be essential
for the security of the Salvadorean refugees.
Sandra Pentland is an associate of the
lesuit Centre for Social Justice. Denis
Racicot is an itrUnigration lawyer. Roth
work with the Comité de travail sur les





1 wish 10 thank all those graduate
students at York University who have
helped produce this year's Refuge. Alex
Zisman and Tanya Basok, in fact,
assunled full editorial responsibility for
this excellent CUITent issue on Central
American refugees. Without the help of
Leslie Rider, my research assistant and
the Managing Editor, we would aIl be
lost.
1 also wish to thank our loyal readers
whose continuing subscriptions and
extra support have enabled us ta
continue to publish Refuge. 1 hope we
have made a contribution to the
understanding of the problem of refugees
and the policy issues with which we aIl
must grapple.
Next year 1 am away on sabbatical. In
1979, at the beginning of my last
sabbatical, 1 got caught up in the
refugee issues of the Boat People and
Operation Lifeline. Since then 1 have
sustained that involvement and helped
develop the refugee research unit at York
University and the publication Refuge.
It is time 10 resume my concentration
on my work in philosophy while 1 write
the results of my research on refugees.
Michael Lanphier, Professor of
Sociology at York University, succeeds
me as Director of the Refugee
Documentation Project and Editar of
Refuge. ~1ichael has a distinguished
record as both a scholar dealing with
refugee issues and as a committed
individual. Alex Zisman will assist
Michael by serving as Feature Editor of
Refuge and Noreen Nimmons will take
over as Managing Editor.
1 am sure you aIl join me in wishing
them and aU the others associatcd with
the Refugee Documentation Project at
York University the best in their future
work.
IIoward Adelman '
--------~
~---------------------------------------
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